Yesterday was the day. At long last, the Angels finally acquired a starting second baseman!
Since Adam Eaton was acquired and Danny Espinosa was already tendered a contract, that meant Espinosa would be relegated to a utility infield role. Going into a contract year, he was understandably bitter with what his role would be. Reports of his unhappiness first surfaced earlier yesterday.
This report, I imagine, substantially lowered his asking price and created a buying opportunity. Between the Padres, Cardinals, Marlins, and Nationals, opposing GMs were likely asking for young, controllable pitching assets. For Billy Eppler and the baseball operations department, this gave them the leverage they needed to strike a deal for Espinosa without giving up much in return.
So without further ado, here’s my take on the Danny Espinosa trade.
Improved run prevention
When it comes to defense, the Angels ranked fourth overall in 2016. Last season, Eppler added Andrelton Simmons to cover the vastness that is Angel Stadium and soak up ground balls. This time, he solidifies the other side of the diamond with Espinosa.
Espinosa has had well above average defensive metrics his entire career. Espinosa, a second baseman by trade, has posted 25 DRS (defensive runs saved) and a 27 UZR (8.1 UZR/150 games) at the position during his career. He played at shortstop this season, recording an 8 DRS and a 1.4 UZR (1.4 UZR/150), proving he can play multiple positions at a high level.
As johnnyangel101 pointed out yesterday, Espinosa was arguably the best defensive second baseman in 2015 with 11.4 defensive runs above average (albeit in two-thirds the innings played).
Eppler has assembled an entire rotation that feasts off getting quick, easy ground ball outs. In addition, he has also experimented with acquiring pitchers based on spin rates (e.g. Andrew Bailey, Daniel Wright). The effectiveness of spin rates is not completely known yet, and because of this it is relatively cheap to acquire unestablished pitchers with promising spin rates. In order for these strategies to work, the infield needs players who can turn those 50-50, 40-60 ground balls into outs to quicken and simplify the game for pitchers.
That’s where Danny Espinosa has his biggest trickle down effect on the team.
Better, smarter baserunning
Entering his eighth MLB season, Espinosa is no longer the runner he once was. But he is using his speed more effectively, making smarter decisions on the basepaths and running into less outs. His baserunning runs above average over the last four years indicate that he may be on an upward trajectory (0.9, 1, 2.5, 5.1 BsR). So while Espinosa isn’t the fastest guy on the block, he doesn’t create outs on the basepaths like others do (everyone except Trout, Maybin, and Calhoun).
Over the course of a season, a Johnny Giavotella’s -2.1 BsR to a 5.0 BsR is the equivalent swing of 3⁄4 of a win, given that each win is approximately 10 runs. To a team intending to contend, that one win could be the difference between a wild card berth and watching the playoffs from the couch.
An offensive upgrade deepens the lineup
No doubt, this is where it gets dicey. Espinosa isn’t necessarily a power hitter yet he strikes out a ton; in fact, he K’s 28% of his at-bats since entering the league. He has been hitting for more power but sacrificing the average and OBP in a major way (he had an gruesome .209/.306/.378 slash line).
Taking a look at Espinosa’s plate discipline statistics, we can see he is swinging less and making less contact. It’s possible that he is being too patient on the first pitches of the at-bat and overcompensating for the strikes on him later in the count by being overaggressive, thereby expanding the zone.
Espinosa has a career BABIP (batting average on balls in play) of .292, but this season it was only .261...Espinosa, for whatever reason, had an unlucky 2016. In seasons with over 300 AB’s (half a season’s worth), Espinosa’s BABIP’s are .292, .333, .319, .299, and .261. It seems flukishly low.
His strikeouts and lack of contact is a major concern, but he also had poor luck this year which should bounce back moving forward.
A proven veteran in a weak 2B market
Is Espinosa the best second baseman out of realistic trade targets like Dietrich, Greg Garcia, or Cory Spangenberg? Probably not, but he has proven he is capable of handling an everyday MLB job for multiple seasons and still has incredible upside. Espinosa’s days of 3.5 fWAR are most likely over, but if he can regain his 94 wRC+ from 2015 he could easily be above average by the end of the season. If there’s anyone who can help him make more contact, it’s Angels hitting coach Dave Hansen, who led the offense to the least strikeouts in MLB in 2016.
The cost
The Angels gave up Kyle Mcgowin and Austin Adams in the deal.
Mcgowin, 25, was viewed as a future contributor until this season begun. Simply put, he has no pitches that work for him anymore. Facing more advanced hitters, he was shelled in the PCL-friendly AAA Salt Lake to the tune of a 6.11 ERA in 22 starts. It’s clear that he needs to move to the bullpen if he wants to sniff the big leagues, and even then I’m not convinced that it would be enough to salvage his career.
Adams, 25, has all of the tools but hasn’t been able to harness them effectively. He has an above average fastball and a plus slider and the 6-foot 3 frame to go with it. However, he has extremely poor command right now, with a 5.23 BB/9. On the flip side, he has electric stuff with a 13.28 K/9 in 32 AA appearances this season. Still, he will need to master command if he wants a relief role in the bigs.
Unlike what other armchair GMs may lead you to believe, there are four fundamental aspects to baseball: hitting, fielding, baserunning, and pitching. And Espinosa upgrades three of those.
This acquisition likely takes the second base position from a -0.6 WAR in 2016 to an approximately 1.9 WAR next year. A 2.5 win swing may not seem like much today, but tell that to the 2016 Mariners or the 2015 Angels. Every win matters.